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and public policymaking processes stand in a recursive relationship. Secondly, I
argue that interest groups take on private governance roles with the aim to remain
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nance. The analysis of interest groups should be extended to the way they shape
markets through private governance mechanisms and how that recursively feeds
back into interest group advocacy and public policymaking processes to fully grasp
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The Institute of International Finance (IIF) plays a crucial role in global financial
governance. With a membership of over 450 global financial corporations it regu-
larly brings together the “Who’sWho” of international financial powerbrokers. The
IIF straddles public policy and private interest representation, taking on an
increasingly important private governance role. An analysis of the historical devel-
opment of the IIF therefore provides important insights into the interaction of
states and business through evolving patterns of interest representation as well
as into the dynamics of public and private mechanisms of global financial
governance.
Despite its prominence in global financial governance, there is scant literature
on the IIF.1 Much of the financial governance literature sees financial associations
like the IIF as representing the interests of their market members to public policy-
makers in a unidirectional manner.2 Newman and Posner (2016, 2018), on the
other hand, note that the emergence of global public policymaking processes func-
tions as a focal point, leading the IIF to gear itself toward these policymaking pro-
cesses. In other words, there is two-directional interaction between interest groups
and public policymaking processes.3 However, their contributions do not address
how the IIF stands in a similar two-directional interaction with the market. The IIF
does not only represent interests emanating from its members but also shapes the
market through private governance mechanisms.
This paper develops this point through a study of the evolution of the IIF with
the aim to understand why it has developed into this hybrid institution that both
lobbies public policymakers and implements private governance mechanisms;
and what the implications of this evolution are for global financial governance.
The paper draws on a unique set of interviews with global financial policymakers
spanning three decades, archive materials, and publicly available policy docu-
ments.4 These sources are linked to wider changes in the global financial system
to address three questions: (i) how has the IIF’s structure and mission developed;
(ii) how has the IIF’s role in global financial governance developed; and (iii) how
can we explain these developments? In answering these questions, I put forward
two novel arguments as contributions to the literature.
1 But see McKeen-Edwards (2009), McKeen-Edwards and Porter (2013), Newman and Posner
(2016, 2018), and Kalaitzake (2017).
2 Underhill (1997); Claessens et al. (2008); Lall (2012).
3 See also Woll (2007, 2008), Posner (2009), and Shaffer (2003).
4 Over 150 interviews were conducted in three waves in 1992/93, 1998, and 2007/08. Former IIF
Managing Director Dallara was interviewed in 2020. In addition, archive materials were collected
from the IIF and International Monetary Fund.
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First, I argue that to explain the role of private interest groups, analysis of the
two-directional interactions between developments in themarket, interest groups,
and public policymakers is needed. This contrasts with the traditional unidirec-
tional view of lobbying where developments in the market lead to policy prefer-
ences that interest groups represent to policymakers. It extends the strand of
literature emphasizing the recursive interaction between interest group prefer-
ences and public policymaking processes to the relation between interest groups
and markets. Through private governance mechanisms, such as norm and stan-
dard setting, interest groups shape markets. The IIF sets standards in the market
for sovereign debt with respect to transparency and crisis resolution and thereby
contributes to the expansion of thismarket in terms of scope, as well as successfully
constrains creditor behavior in sovereign debt crises.
Secondly, I argue that interest groups take on these private governance roles
with the aim to remain the preferred interlocutor of public policymakers vis-à-vis
competing interest groups. In doing so, they no longer solely represent their
members or respond to functional demands resulting from market developments
but pursue organizational self-interest and actively shape the market structure.
The rise of competing transnational financial associations led the IIF to develop
a standard with respect to sovereign debt crisis resolution, which simultaneously
shaped the market and public policymaking. The IIF took on this private gover-
nance role with the aim to remain the focal point in the area of sovereign debt
crisis resolution, where rival capital market associations played an increasing
role. This strategy paid off when the IIF was given the central role in the Greek
debt restructuring of 2011/12, allowing it to shape the restructuring package and
thereby the risk profile of peripheral Eurozone countries’ debt.
These two arguments have important implications for the study of interest
groups and global governance. The traditional approach to private sector lobbying
needs to be extended to theway interest groups shapemarkets through private gov-
ernancemechanisms, and how that recursively feeds back into interest group advo-
cacy and public policymaking processes. In addition, to better understand the
emergence of private patterns of governance and its interaction with public gover-
nance mechanisms, we should study interest group competition within the oppor-
tunities and constraints emanating from global public policymaking processes.
The following section discusses the literature on interest representation and
private governance in global policymaking processes. Section two conducts a
first empirical test of the expectations developed in the theoretical section by ana-
lyzing the organizational developments of the IIF. The third section presents a case
study of the IIF’s role in the governance of sovereign debt crisis resolution. The
final section concludes by discussing how the evolution of the IIF demonstrates
that interest groups should be understood in a recursive interaction with changing
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market structures and public policymaking processes. In addition, the section con-
cludes that it is the competitive dynamic between interest groups that results in the
development of private governance roles. Currently under-researched, the role of
interest groups in shaping markets warrants further examination.
Private interests and global governance
The re-emergence of global finance in the 1970s and ’80s led to a burgeoning lit-
erature on policymaking processes leading to emerging patterns of global financial
governance.5 The following discussion starts with literature on the role of private
interest groups in these processes. Subsequently, the literature regarding the
emergence of private governance is discussed.
From one-way to two-way street from Lobbyville
Numerous scholars have demonstrated substantial financial sector influence on
global public policymaking processes.6 Notwithstanding this extensive scholar-
ship, important questions remain with respect to variety over time and context
of financial sector influence, as well as with respect to collaboration and competi-
tion among financial associations.7 A first strand of literature sees financial asso-
ciations as representing the interests of their members to public policymakers in a
unidirectional manner. This literature implicitly follows a functionalist logic
assuming that transnational financial associations emerge as a consequence of
financial globalization.8 When changes in the market structure lead to shifts in
members’ interests, the advocacy of associations adjusts. For example, in the
1990s, large banks increasingly relied on internal risk management models in
their credit market activities. Reflecting this change in market practice, the IIF
started advocating for banks to be allowed to use their internal models in deter-
mining risk buffers. This subsequently became one of the main topics in the rene-
gotiation of the first Basel Capital Accord in the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision.9 In sum, advocacy stems from market developments and reflects
shifting interests of the market members of the financial association.
5 Moran (1991); Kapstein (1994); Helleiner (1994); Underhill (1995, 1997); Baker (2006); Singer
(2007); Wood (2005).
6 Tsingou (2008, 2015); Claessens et al. (2008); Lall (2012); Underhill (2015).
7 Macartney et al. (2020); Young (2012).
8 Underhill (1997); Claessens et al. (2008).
9 Tarullo (2008); Tsingou (2008).
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In contrast, a second strand of literature argues that there is two-way, recursive
interaction between private interest representation and public policymaking pro-
cesses. Shaffer (2003) points to “reverse lobbying” where public officials invite
private representatives to provide input into public policymaking processes. The
public sector might even be closely involved in the establishment of interest
groups.10 Newman and Posner (2016, 2018) argue that the emergence of transna-
tional public policymaking processes functions as a focal point for interest groups,
leading them to reorganize and (re-)formulate positions in a “second-order effect.”
The advocacy role of private interest groups is thus not only dependent on the
“supply side” of market interests but also on the “demand side” of public policy-
making processes. Moreover, strategic constraints emanating from public policy-
making processes shape private sector positions.11 To be successful in influencing
European-level public actors, for example, interest groups have to adhere to the
European Union’s broad goal of market integration. Similarly, stringent domestic
regulations can lead interest groups to lobby for comparably stringent global reg-
ulations to “level the playing field.”12 In sum, this strand of literature emphasizes
that the advocacy role of interest groups is co-determined by public policymaking
processes.
The focus on lobbying of these two strands of literature underestimates the
equally important role of interest groups in developing the market and setting
norms for market participants, however. Through private governance, a second
recursive relation emerges between the market structure and interest groups.
From lobby to private governance
A growing body of literature addresses private mechanisms of governance at the
global level.13 This subsection first discusses how business associations shape
the development of markets through their activities. Secondly, explanations for
why business associations take on such role are discussed.
There are two main mechanisms through which governance activities of busi-
ness associations shapemarkets. The first is by increasingmarket transparency, for
example, through (standardized) data collection and dissemination. This reduces
10 Posner (2009); Baker and Wigan (2017).
11 Woll (2007, 2008).
12 Oatley and Nabors (1998). Chalmers (2017) demonstrates this logic for individual banks’ lob-
bying behavior.
13 Cutler et al. (1999); Haufler (2001); Hall and Biersteker (2002). See Büthe (2010b) for an
overview.
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transaction costs and contributes to market expansion.14 By determining the cov-
erage of data collection, business associations can steer the scope of the market.
For example, providing economic data and analysis on new countries can facilitate
the inclusion of these countries in the financial markets’ realm. The second mech-
anism works through constraints on the behavior of market actors, for example, by
establishing codes of conduct or by disseminating “best practices.”15Actors that do
not adhere to “best practices” or other forms of private governancemight be (infor-
mally) excluded from the market.16 This private norms-setting can also be condu-
cive to overcome collective action problems, which hamper market development.
A first set of explanations forwhy business associations take up these private gov-
ernance role sees it as a functionalist response to financial globalization and the
increasing complexity of markets.17 These market developments make it harder for
public policymakers to design and enforce effective regulations, leading them to del-
egate to the private sector. Business associations are willing to take up this role to
reduce the rising transaction costs that come with the increasing complexity.18
A second set of explanations focusses on the “shadow of public intervention.”
Public policymakers demand the development of governance patterns from the
private sector under the threat of public intervention in the market. Oftentimes,
this means public policymakers stay involved in the private negotiations as observ-
ers, and give their blessing to the resulting private governance mechanisms.19 At
other times, private governancemechanisms are developed by the private sector to
pre-empt (potentially more burdensome) public governance. For example,
Helleiner (2009) argues that the IIF set up a code of conduct for sovereign debt
restructuring as a response to the threat of an International Monetary Fund
(IMF) statutory public mechanism.20
A third set of explanations points to organizational self-interest in the context
of competitive interaction between business associations.21 Fragmentation in the
structure of interest representation and the resulting competition between
interest groups lessens the power they are able to exert over policymaking
14 McKeen-Edwards and Porter (2013), 68–70.
15 See Young (2013) on the IIF’s best practices initiative.
16 Mügge (2008).
17 Haufler (2001), Mosley (2009).
18 Cutler et al. (1999).
19 Börzel and Risse (2005) argue that the shadow of public intervention compels private actors
into transnational public-private governance partnerships. Ritter (2010) applies this perspective to
the Principles for Stable Capital Flows (see case study below).
20 See case study below. A careful analysis of the sequencing and newly unearthed empirical
materials lead me to a different interpretation of this case.
21 Büthe (2010a).
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processes.22 Taking up private governance roles counters this diminishing influ-
ence. Büthe (2010a) provides a number of conditions under which private gover-
nance can successfully be established in the face of rival associations. First of all,
the organizational structure of an interest group should enable it to follow its self-
interest (e.g., by having staff capacity), even if it is not of direct benefit to its
members. Secondly, building expertise in private governance enables an associa-
tion to remain pre-eminent as the first mover. Thirdly, the institutional context can
enable certain interest groups to establish private governance mechanisms over
others. For example, transnationalization of public policymaking has a second
order effect on the competition between interest groups that benefits those asso-
ciations that are similarly transnational.23
In sum, different expectations emerge in the literature with respect to the evo-
lution of the IIF’s advocacy and private governance role. The functionalist expla-
nation would expect the IIF to take up a governance role in response to the growth
and increasing complexity of the sovereign debt market. The shadow of public
intervention explanation would expect the IIF to develop private governance
mechanisms in response to the threat of public mechanisms. The interest group
competition explanation would expect the IIF to take up governance roles in
response to other associations encroaching on its turf. The establishment of
private governance mechanisms creates a recursive relation between association
and market structure: the association represents its members’ interests, but also
feeds back into the market with private governance mechanisms constraining
members’ behavior. These expectations will be investigated by analyzing the orga-
nizational development of the IIF (next section two) and its role in the governance
of sovereign debt crisis resolution (section three).
Structure and mission
This section analyzes the origins, membership, mission, and activities of the IIF in
relation to public policymaking processes and market developments. This pro-
vides a first test of the nature of these relations as one-way or recursive.
Origin
The idea for establishing the IIF was conceived at a conference of high-level public
and private policymakers sponsored by the American think tank the National
22 Coleman (1994); Young (2012).
23 Newman and Posner (2018).
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Planning Association (May 1982, Ditchley Park, United Kingdom). The increasing
involvement of private banks in sovereign lending to emerging markets since the
1970s had led to a patchy picture of the exposure and economic developments in
these markets. The IIF was intended to provide a forum for exchange of informa-
tion, and thereby increase transparency in the market. This would contribute to a
better assessment of the risks of banks loans to emerging markets, and thereby
benefit further market growth. Although a role as negotiating forum between
debtor countries and the private sector in case of sovereign debt crisis was dis-
cussed, in the end, the IIF explicitly rejected this role out of concern for US antitrust
law.24 The IIF emphasized that it did not intend to present a united front of bankers
to borrowing countries. The IIF was formally established in January 1983 and took
office in Washington, DC.25 This location was chosen in light of its close coopera-
tion with the IMF and the World Bank and to underscore its independence from
Wall Street banks.26
Public officials at theDitchley Parkmeeting hadwelcomed the idea of a private
sector association. Jacques De Larosière, managing director of the IMF, in partic-
ular encouraged the idea. The IMF’s Executive Board was extensively briefed on
the IIF’s establishment, pointing out that it could function as “a focal point for dia-
logue between the international banking community and multilateral institutions,
central banks, and supervisory authorities in the developed countries.”27 The IMF,
BIS, and OECD granted the IIF access to their hitherto confidential reports, provid-
ing an important impetus to the new association. In other words, from its origin,
the IIF was not just a reflection of market interests but just as much a reflection of
the demand by public policymakers for an interlocutor.
Membership
At its establishment, membership was limited to banks with (impending) interna-
tional exposure. Thirty-eight banks from Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States
became founding members in January 1983.28 Against the backdrop of the Latin
American debt crisis, membership rapidly expanded in the first year to almost
190 banks.29 Subsequently, membership numbers decreased steadily until the
24 IMF Archives (1983), 3–4.
25 Surrey and Nash (1984).
26 IIF (2007), 5.




midnineties. Syndicated bank lending to emerging markets effectively stopped, so
many smaller banks were no longer internationally active and cancelled their
membership. In addition, mergers and acquisitions among the membership
reduced its number.
The decline was mitigated by rising membership of nonbanks, such as invest-
ment managers. These had become increasingly involved in bond market financ-
ing of emerging markets, filling the gap left by the reduction of bank lending. The
IIF also initiated new advocacy work as a membership recruitment tool, opening
up to a widening range of financial institutions. This started with work on the
market risk amendment to the Basel Capital Accord, which was particularly rele-
vant for investment banks.30 At a later stage, the IIF’s importance as a financial
sector advocate at the global level resulted in insurance companies joining the
IFF rather than forming a new transnational financial associationwhen policymak-
ing in the insurance area moved to the global level. The IIF duly expanded its work
in this policy area.31
IIF membership also expanded geographically. From the early 1990s, banks
from emerging markets increasingly found common ground with the traditional
membership and joined.32 Following the 1997/1998 East Asian crisis, a second
wave of financial institutions from emerging markets joined, wanting to be
heard in global-level policymaking.33 Today, full membership is open to firms
who are internationally active in banking, securities, and insurance. Associate
membership and special affiliations are open to another set of institutions active
in the global financial system, like accountants, multilateral development banks,
export insurers, and stock exchanges.34Membership stands atmore than 450 insti-
tutions from over seventy countries, with about half of the membership from
emerging markets.35
Membership dues are determined by type and size of member institutions. In
1987, the IIF’s budget stood at US$9.3 million (in 2018 dollars) rising to $34.5
million in 2018. Staff increased over this period from about forty to about eighty.
General meetings are scheduled to coincide with the IMF and World Bank Spring
and Annual Meetings, to facilitate exchange with these institutions.36 In addition,
the IIF opened representative offices in, amongst others, Beijing (2010) and
30 Interviewwith IIF officials, Washington DC, April 1998, IIF (2007), 61. Cf. Newman and Posner
(2016).
31 IIF, Annual Report 2011, 22.
32 Ibid. 1993.
33 IIF (2007).
34 McKeen-Edwards (2009), 347.
35 www.iif.com, accessed January 2020 and IIF (2012), 141.
36 IIF (2007), 138.
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Brussels (2017) to strengthen ties to regional members and engage regulators in
Asia and Europe.
The development of its membership was aptly summarized in the IIF’s 1994
Annual Report: “Some observers still view the Institute as a G-10 commercial
bankers’ club addressing the international debt problem of the 1980s. This view
is incorrect. The securitization and globalization of financial markets have led
the Institute to adapt both the structure and composition of its membership.”37
The IIF not only changed its membership, though, but also its activities.
Mission and activities
The original mandate of the IIF was “to promote a better understanding of inter-
national lending transactions generally; to collect, analyze and disseminate infor-
mation regarding the economic and financial position of particular countries
which are substantial borrowers in the international markets (…); and to engage
in other appropriate activities to facilitate, and preserve the integrity of interna-
tional lending transactions.”38 The latter clause was soon interpreted as to
include advocacy work, which forms a first pillar of the IIF’s activities. From
1985 on, the IIF sends a bi-annual letter to the members of the IMF’s main govern-
ing body to inform them of its positions regarding the agenda of the day.39 In 1986,
the incoming Managing Director Horst Schulmann aimed “to make the IIF into an
organization that speaks for the international banking industry the way the
American Bankers Association speaks for the domestic banking industry.”40
Policy advocacy further intensified after Charles Dallara took the reigns as manag-
ing director in 1993. This is reflected in the current mission statement: “to support
the financial industry in the prudentmanagement of risks; to develop sound indus-
try practices; and to advocate for regulatory, financial and economic policies that
are in the broad interests of its members and foster global financial stability and
sustainable economic growth.”41
The IIF focuses its advocacy work on the global level, with only limited involve-
ment in domestic-level implementation of international regulations.42 Policy positions
are developed through a self-selecting working group and committee structure
37 IIF, Annual Report 1994, 3.
38 IIF (1983).
39 Ibid. (2007), 21.
40 The New York Times, 29 September 1986, D2.
41 www.iif.com, accessed January 2020.
42 Interviewwith IIF officials, Washington, DC, June 2008. In the 1990s, the IIF was not registered
as a US lobby group so was explicitly prohibited from trying to influence US policy (interview with
IIF officials, Washington, DC, April 1992).
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broadly representative of themembership.43Thisworkswell since “thesemajor banks,
Barclays, Citibank, might find they have in fact more in commonwith each other than
with smaller banks of their own country.”44 Its advocacy work responds to the emer-
gence of global-level public policymaking processes. For example, the IIF organized its
regulatory work in the field of bank capital adequacy standards in such a way as to
mirror the Basel Committee structure.45 In turn, the Basel Committee, on occasion,
asks the IIF to coordinate private sector input when new topics emerge in the policy-
making process, and closely collaborates with the IIF in general.46
In comparison to other associations, the IIF seeks a pro-active stance to
public policymaking processes and frames its policy positions in less
technical terms.47 It seeks to develop policy positions from the wider perspective
of the global financial system, not necessarily narrowly reflecting member inter-
ests. As longstanding Managing Director Dallara puts it “we were there as a
voice of the private financial community, but we were never a blind advocate for
bad practices, weak governance, or weak risk management.”48 This is reflected in
positions that echo public policy goals, such as international financial stability, and
demonstrates how the IIF can follow its self-interest.
The second pillar of the IIF’s work is economic analysis and provision of
emerging market data to its members. When public availability of economic
data increased and members strengthened their analytical capacity, the IIF
increasingly focused on smaller countries for which it was more likely that its
members had no in-house expertise.49 In addition, from the early 1990s on, the
“Capital Flows to Emerging Market Economies” report is publicly released and
has received significant media attention. Through the provision of data and anal-
ysis, the IIF increasesmarket transparency and contributes to expanding the scope
of sovereign debt markets to smaller countries.
The IIF has expanded its economic analysis and data provisioning work with
standard-setting. Its 1995 report “Improving standards for data release by
43 Interview with IIF officials, Washington, DC, June 2008. A confidential interview source (2008)
mentioned that in the early 2000s, Japanese banks were encouraged by their Ministry of Finance to
take a more active role in the IIF. This would represent an interesting case of multilevel “reverse
lobbying” (Shaffer 2003), where domestic public policymakers try to influence the global-level
policy positions of the IIF.
44 Interview with IIF officials, Washington, DC, April 1992.
45 Ibid., June 2008. See also IIF, Annual Report 2005, 13 and Newman and Posner (2016).
46 Interview with IIF officials, Washington, DC, June 2008.
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Emerging Market Economies” indicates economic variables that countries should
publish and with what frequency they should do so.50 After some years of monitor-
ing compliance, this work fed into the IMF’s Special Data Dissemination
Standard.51 The IIF subsequently shifted focus to Investor Relations, establishing
best practices and a “Sovereign Investor Relations Advisory Service” in 2002.52
From 2005, it regularly scores countries on their investor relations practices.53
The IIF thus increasingly takes on a private governance role with respect to trans-
parency of the debtor side of the market for sovereign debt and aims to shape
debtor behavior when it comes to investor relations.
In sum, this section demonstrates that the organizational evolution of the IIF
not only follows developments in themarket but also responds to developments in
public policymaking processes. Its membership expanded as a consequence of
changes in the market structure like global integration, but also because the IIF
pro-actively developed advocacy work in the area of bank capital adequacy regu-
lation in response to developments at the Basel Committee. Furthermore, the evi-
dence presented demonstrates that the IIF plays an important role in increasing
transparency in the market for sovereign debt and has developed a governance
role with respect to data dissemination standards. In other words, the IIF contrib-
uted to the expansion and shaping of this market (e.g., the inclusion of smaller
countries). The following section provides a second empirical test of the recursive
relations of the IIF to markets and public policymaking processes through a case
study of the governance of sovereign debt crisis resolution.
Governing sovereign debt crises
Since the growth of private sovereign lending stood at the origins of the IIF, the
policymaking process on the governance of sovereign debt crisis resolution is a
key case to analyze the development of its role. The various governance
mechanisms proposed in response to the sovereign debt crisis differ in the
extent to which they constrain different sets of private actors.54 The private
sector prefers market-based governance mechanisms that steer toward voluntary
debt restructurings.55 This puts less constraints on market actor behavior, and
hence limits risks of losses for private creditors. On the other side of the spectrum
50 Ibid. (1995).
51 Ibid. (2007), 50.
52 IIF, Annual Report 2002, 26.
53 IIF (2005). This was continued in the annual Principles Implementation Reports (see below).
54 Brooks (2019); Helleiner (2008, 2009).
55 Rieffel (2003); Soederberg (2005).
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are proposals for a statutory mechanism (a “bankruptcy court for states”), which
would be able to enforce debt restructurings on private creditors.56 This case
study analyzes the role of the IIF in different episodes of policymaking responding
to sovereign debt crises from the 1980s Latin American debt crisis to the Greek
restructuring in 2011/12. The increasingly significant private governance role the
IIF has taken in this policy area will be explained and its impact on the market
discussed.
The Latin American debt crisis: lobbying for public support
In the summer of 1982, Mexico shocked markets by declaring that it could no
longer fulfill its debt obligations. Other emerging markets followed, making it
apparent that the banks’ capacity to meet losses was insufficient. In the United
States, banks’ exposure to the seventeen most indebted emerging markets was
well over 100 percent of capital, while for British banks it stood at 85 percent of
capital.57 Pressured by the IMF and American Treasury Secretary Baker, banks
agreed to rollover (part of) their loans in return for official crisis lending and eco-
nomic reforms in the debtor countries.58
The coordination of bankers’ positions in country cases took place in informal
creditor committees (so-called London Clubs). The IIF’s involvement in this
process was limited to coordinating the smaller banks, which were not usually
part of this London Club resolution process.59 While it proved relatively easy to
find consensus in London Clubs immediately after Mexico’s announcement,
national differences in the handling of the crisis made it more and more difficult
to maintain the private sector consensus.60 This offered an opportunity for the IIF
to establish itself as the advocacy group for the global banking community (as dis-
cussed above). The IIF argued that more official lending and economic reforms
would suffice to resolve the crisis without (involuntary) restructuring of private
debts. This contrasted with several proposals for statutory mechanisms to force
a restructuring of the Latin American debts.61
As the crisis dragged on during the 1980s, the new American Treasury
Secretary Brady decided to break the stalemate. His 1989 plan offered a securitiza-
tion of emerging market debts backed by official financing and private debt
56 Rogoff and Zettelmeyer (2002).
57 Cline (1995), tables 2.10–2.14.
58 Sachs (1986), 398.
59 IMF Archives (1983), 3–4.
60 Interview IIF officials, Washington, DC, April 1992.
61 See Rogoff and Zettelmeyer (2002).
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restructuring. The IIF responded negatively and emphasized that the Brady plan
was leading to increasing arrears in emerging markets and potentially eroded
market discipline in the international financial system. It advocated for voluntary
debt reductions and IMF pressure on debtor countries to maintain interest pay-
ments to commercial banks.62 Despite the IIF’s lobby, the Brady plan went
ahead and turned out to have a significant impact on the emerging market debt
market (see figure 1 below).
The securitization of emerging market debt under the Brady plan led to a large
increase in bond financing of emerging markets, offering new profit opportunities
to banks. These benefits led the IIF to soften its opposition to this ad hoc resolution
of the debt crisis.63 In other words, the public governancemechanismdeveloped to
deal with the Latin American debt crisis led to a change in the market structure for
sovereign debts, which subsequently caused a shift in the IIF’s position.
The East Asian crisis: grappling with collective action
Despite the proclaimed success of the Brady plan, Mexico found itself in crisis
again in 1995. When it proved difficult to coordinate dispersed bondholders into
debt rollovers, the increasing sums of official crisis lending necessary to quell the
crisis became clear. In response, the Group of 10 (G10, a grouping of public offi-
cials of creditor countries) started work on a standard for so-called Collective
Action Clauses (CACs), which facilitate bond restructurings.64 The IMF started
work on a statutory mechanism to enforce debt restructurings through public
intervention.65 The IIF resisted these initiatives and continued to argue for
market-based, voluntary approaches.66 It highlighted its work on data dissemina-
tion standards and investor relations as the way forward.67 In other words, it pro-
posed a private governance pattern that focused on increasing market
transparency through constraining debtor states’ behavior.
The 1997/1998 East Asian crisis strengthened the resolve of public officials to
develop mechanisms that could limit official crisis lending. In response, the IIF
launched its “most ambitious project ever in the regulatory field” in the form of
the high-level Steering Committee on Emerging Markets Finance.68
62 The American Banker, 4 May 1990.
63 IIF (2007), 38.
64 G10 (1996).
65 IMF Archives (1995).
66 IIF (1996).
67 IIF (1995).
68 IIF, Annual Report 1999, 2.
14 Jasper Blom
Common threads through the advocacy of the Steering Committee were increasing
transparency on the part of debtor countries, a case-by-case approach, and
opposition to nonvoluntary private sector involvement. The IIF did support the
public sector in addressing so-called vulture funds: creditors that bought
distressed country debt and aggressively pursued repayment.69 This can be
interpreted as an attempt to accommodate public sector preferences for orderly
restructuring while simultaneously shaping the market by excluding “free riders”
amongst private creditors.
The IMF’s work on a statutory approach got a high-profile push in 2001 by First
Deputy Managing Director Anne Krueger when she proposed the Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM).70 When Krueger had sounded the idea of the
SDRM in the IMF’s Capital Markets Consultative Group, private representatives
reacted more or less indifferently. They expected the proposal to be too complex
to get anywhere. Only the IIF was outspoken in it opposition from the start, diverg-
ing from its members.71 After the November 2001 launch of the statutory proposal,
the IIF was again quick to voice condemnation.72 In a private meeting with public
Figure 1. Components outstanding debt upper-middle-income countries
Source: World Bank International Debt Statistics
69 IIF (2002).
70 IMF (2001).
71 Confidential document source (2001a).
72 IIF, Press Release, 17 December 2001.
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officials, Dallara described the SDRM as “a complete abrogation of creditor’s
rights” and “an obstacle to globalization as evidenced by the support of anti-glob-
alization NGOs like the Jubilee Debt Campaign.”73 This divergence between the
position of IIF members and the IIF itself illustrates its increasing capacity to
pursue an independent course of action, as well as its concern with preserving
the globally integrated market structure.
As a demonstration of the shadow of public intervention, which the IMF’s pro-
posal cast, the IIF reversed its opposition to the contractual approach of the G10. It
took the lead as liaison representing a coalition of interest groups involved in capital
market financing of sovereign debts to Randall Quarles, the United States Treasury
official chairing the working group that was developing the G10 model for CACs.74
Its long-standing expertise vis-à-vis the newer capital market associations likely
explains the IIF’s ability to take the lead in this process. At the same time, the IIF
built a broad private sector coalition of financial associations to oppose the SDRM.
In light of the private sector opposition and hesitations on the part of the
United States, public officials of creditor countries increasingly recognized that
their support for the SDRM was a leverage instrument to get the private sector
to commit to CACs.75 The IIF upped the pressure by making clear that its
support for CACs was conditional: the IIF-led coalition threatened to withdraw
its support for the CACs if discussions on the SDRM continued.76 The traditional
IIF policy brief in advance of the IMF SpringMeetingwas this time accompanied by
high-level visits of local banks to public policymakers to drive home the point.77
The anticipated effects of the SDRM on the market structure proved to be the
final nail in its coffin. Emerging markets feared that the implementation of a stat-
utory approach would increase borrowing costs because the private sector would
be more constrained in case of debt crisis. This led them to side with the coalition
of financial associations in opposition to the SDRM. Just before the SDRM was
coming to a make-or-break decision at the 2003 IMF Spring Meeting, Mexico con-
ducted a widely publicized bond issuance with CACs—as it later admitted “to get
rid of the SDRM.”78 As intended, the SDRM was shelved that Spring Meeting.
In sum, the IIF has successfully represented its members’ opposition to stat-
utorymechanisms. The anticipated effects on themarket for emergingmarket debt
73 Confidential document source (2001b).
74 Gelpern and Gulati (2006), 66.
75 Confidential document source.
76 Letter toMinisters of Finance signed by EMTA, IIF, IPMA, BondMarket Association, SIA, ISMA
and EMCA, 6 December 2002.
77 For example, Board members of ABN AMRO and ING visited the Dutch Minister of Finance.
78 LatinFinance, December 2003, 24.
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proved to be an important factor in forming a coalition with emerging market offi-
cials. Under the shadow of public intervention, the IIF did agree to a public gover-
nance mechanism in the form of a G10 model for collective action clauses in
international bonds of emerging markets. In the process, other financial associa-
tions representing capital market actors had gained relevance in the governance of
sovereign debt crisis resolution.
The Principles: taking center stage
The IIF spotted an opportunity to remain the focal point for global public policy-
makers in the face of increasing competition of other associations when the gover-
nor of the Banque de France (Jean-Claude Trichet) proposed to develop a Code of
Good Conduct for relations between sovereign debtors and creditors.79 This Code
aimed to facilitate orderly sovereign debt crisis resolutions through early engage-
ment with creditors, information sharing, comparable treatment among creditors,
fair burden sharing, negotiating in good faith, and restoring debt sustainability.
With his proposal, Trichet also aimed to restart a constructive dialogue among
public and private actors after the confrontational discussions on the SDRM.
The IIF latched on to this idea and contacted Trichet.80 The G20 agreed to del-
egate the development of the Code to aworking group led by the Banque de France
and the IIF.81 The working group included four key emerging markets (Brazil,
Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey) and capital market associations. The public
sector thus put the IIF in the driver’s seat, even more so as the Banque de
France subsequently left the working group. The Banque de France reasoned
that compliance with a voluntary code was best ensured if it was developed by
its subjects alone.
The IIF took this opportunity and relegated the other associations to the back-
benches, pointing to its earlier work on sovereign investor relations as the natural
precursor to this work.82 During the negotiations, the emphasis shifted from a
Code of Conduct for debt restructuring to principles for crisis prevention
through more debtor transparency and dialogue with creditors.83 However, the
private governance pattern, which the Code entails, also intends to constrain the
behavior of emerging markets creditors. For example, creditors are encouraged to
79 Banque de France (2003).
80 Interview with Dallara, telephone, April 2020.
81 G20 (2003).
82 Euromoney, 1 December 2004. Cf. Büthe (2010a) on timing and sequencing.
83 Confidential document source (2004).
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participate in debt rollovers and should engage in good faith restructuring
negotiations.84
In November 2004, the IIF presented the “Principles for Stable Capital Flows
and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets.” They were “welcomed” and
“supported” the same weekend by the G20.85 Reflecting the strive among associ-
ations, the Emerging Market Traders Association and Emerging Markets Creditors
Association did not support the Principles because they perceived them as insuf-
ficiently in line with private sector preferences.86 Market participants’ initial
response ranged from mildly positive to critical. Many market participants did
not seem to think the Principles would be very relevant.87 However, this misread
the ability of the IIF to follow its organizational self-interest and entrench the
central private governance role it had obtained.
The IIF established the Principles Consultative Group (PCG) and a Group of
Trustees of the Principles in 2005 to monitor the implementation of the Principles.
These groups are used to draw in top-level public and private policymakers. The
Trustees are currently co-chaired by Axel Weber (Chairman of UBS AG, former
Bundesbank president), Francois Villeroy de Galhau (Governor Banque de
France), and Yi Gang (Governor People’s Bank of China).88 The PCG’s annual
“Principles Implementation Report” assesses sovereign debtors’ and creditors’
compliance with the Principles and provides case studies of debt restructurings
under them. In late 2006, the PCG also established a working group to define a
balanced application of the Principles toward investors and creditors.89 In individ-
ual debt restructurings, “Principles-based” creditor committees have convinced
other creditors to join the restructuring, reflecting an effect of the Principles on
the behavior of market actors.90
Through its continuing focus on the implementation of the Principles, the IIF,
in effect, functions as the central (private) governance mechanism in the resolu-
tion of sovereign debt crisis, while it co-opts public sector officials in the Group of
Trustees. In doing so, it remains the preferred interlocutor of the public sector in
the face of increasing competition from other associations. The implementation of
the Principles meant the IIF went beyond itsmembers’ interests (as reflected in the
indifferent initial response of market actors) and constrains their behavior by
84 IIF (2004).
85 G20 (2004).
86 Euromoney, 1 December 2004.
87 IMF (2005), 16–17.
88 www.iif.com, accessed January 2020.
89 PCG 2007 (emphasis added). Subsequent Implementation Reports unfortunately do not
report what came of this attempt to shape the creditor side of the market.
90 Interview with IIF officials, Washington, DC, June 2008.
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setting a standard of collective action. These effects of the Principles were put in
sharp relief by the Eurozone crisis.
The Eurozone crisis: IIF in the lead
In thewake of the 2008Global Financial Crisis, several countries in the periphery of
the Eurozone struggled with excessive debt burdens. A series of IMF rescue pack-
ages in 2010 (Greece and Ireland) and 2011 (Portugal) was followed by an unprec-
edented debt restructuring in Greece in 2011/12. The Eurozone crisis presented
new challenges for public policymakers, as these countries were part of amonetary
union and most Eurozone sovereign debt was domestic (and thus did not include
the G10 model-CACs). The Principles allowed the IIF to play a crucial role in the
European policymaking process on governance mechanisms as well as in the
actual restructuring of Greece.
At the global level policy discussions, some academics and think tanks again
put forward more interventionist statutory proposals.91 These proposals were
mostly ignored, however. European governments worried that opening a discus-
sion on statutory mechanisms would lead to contagion, while the IMF noted that
there was still a lack of support amongst its membership as the United States con-
tinued to oppose. Since these proposals gained limited traction in the global pol-
icymaking process, the IIF did not see the need to set up a high-level lobby
campaign as it did in the wake of the East Asian crisis.
The situation was different at the EU level, however. Germany proposed a
European sovereign debt mechanism with private sector involvement (although
without being clear how this would be enforced) in October 2010. Although the
IIF usually focuses on global policymaking processes, this announcement led
them to intensify engagement with the European process. The German proposals
set off intense negotiations in the European Union, during which the IIF lobbied
the European institutions and Eurozone ministries of finance to ensure the
European plans would be consistent with the voluntary, market-based approach
of the Principles.92 The IIF emphasized that restructuring should only be a last
resort.93 France was receptive to the IIF’s position since its banks were heavily
exposed to the crisis countries. Additionally, the possibility of a nonvoluntary
restructuring had led to a drastic reassessment of risks of sovereign lending to
peripheral Eurozone countries, which deepened the crisis. This ensured that a stat-
utory mechanism was quickly taken off the table, despite initial German support.
91 See IMF (2013) for an overview.
92 IIF (2012), 42–44.
93 IIF, Annual Report 2010.
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In aDecember 2010meeting, the chairs of the EuropeanCouncil (VanRompuy)
and the European Commission (Barosso) reassured the IIF that the EU’s framework
would be consistent with the Principles and was based on a voluntary case-by-case
approach.94 This was confirmed by the European Council in March 2011. The EU
compromise consisted of two planks with respect to sovereign debt restructuring
(in the context of setting up the European Stability Mechanism, the EU’s own
rescue fund). Bonds emitted by Euro Area member states would include CACs
based on theG10model clauses. Thismeant that this global governancemechanism
was extended to domestically issued bonds, at least in the Eurozone. The other
plank was the possibility of debt restructurings, based on provisions similar to
those in the Principles.95 It is telling that the IIF was able to establish such high-
level access to the policymaking process compared to other (European) financial
associations. Its role as steward of the Principles certainly played a role here, as it
did in the IIF’s involvement in the unique debt restructuring case of Greece.
Despite the rescue packages, the situation in Greece deteriorated to the extent
that its sovereign debt was unsustainable. European public policymakers invited the
IIF to perform what the IIF itself described as an “unprecedented and vital role as a
guiding force and honest broker with regard to private sector involvement in support
of Greece.”96 In other words, taking up a role as private governance mechanism has
allowed the IIF to play a central role in subsequent cases of sovereign debt restruc-
turings.97 This enabled the IIF to ensure that the Greek crisis did not set unwanted
precedents andwas in line with themarket-based approach to sovereign debt crises.
In its dealings with Greek and European officials, the IIF emphasized that the
Principles were the international standard for sovereign debt restructurings. This
enabled it to successfully push back on suggestions from, amongst others, the
German Chancellor’s office and Greece that an involuntary debt restructuring
should be attempted.98 The October 2011 Eurosummit committed to a voluntary
restructuring, in line with the norm espoused by the IIF. The IIF did not only con-
strain public policymakers with its private governance mechanism, however. It
also constrained private creditors into collective action. When faced with private
creditors who wanted to make a deal on their own or holdout, the IIF would
bring the Principles to bear to ensure wide participation in the deal the creditor
committee headed by Dallara had struck.99 Its success in doing this is reflected
94 IIF, Annual Report 2010.
95 European Council. Conclusions 24/25 March 2011.
96 IIF, Annual Report 2011, 2. See also Kalaitzake (2017).
97 Kalaitzake (2017) also points to the importance of the IIF’s technical expertise.
98 Interview with Dallara, telephone, April 2020.
99 Ibid.
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in the high participation rate in the final deal reached in February 2012, which was
approved by creditors representing 84 percent of eligible debt.
In sum, this case demonstrates how the IIF evolved into the principal private
sector interlocutor for global public policymaking processes during the Latin
American debt crisis, advocating increased official crisis financing. However, the
shift to capital market financing of emerging markets as a consequence of the
Brady plan led to the rise of rival financial associations. In subsequent discussions
on the governance of sovereign debt crisis resolution in the wake of the East Asian
crisis, the IIF took on a private governance role through the Principles. Self-interest
in the context of interassociation competition best explains why the IIF took on this
role. The development of the Code only began in earnest after the SDRM had
already been shelved, indicating that the shadow of public intervention does not
convince as an explanation. The IIF’s role in this private governance mechanism
also doesn’t fit with a functionalist demand from themarket, witnessed by the luke-
warm reception by its members and the opposition of other financial associations.
The effectiveness of the IIF’s self-interested strategy was demonstrated in the
Eurozone crisis. The Principles ensured the IIF of a key position in European-level
policymaking processes on sovereign debt crisis resolution as well as in actual
crisis negotiations. They were key in setting the norm for public policymakers in
the Eurozone debt crisis. Importantly for the argument developed in this paper,
the Principles also constrained the private creditor side of the market. The norm
of collective action in sovereign debt restructurings, which the Principles instilled
in the private sector, leads to a reassessment of credit risks of emerging markets
and thus affects the market. One could say that the IIF developed over this time
from a poacher seeking public bailouts to a gamekeeper forcing private creditor
participation in restructurings. The next section will develop the overarching con-
clusions we can draw from the development of the IIF in relation to changing
market structures and public policymaking processes.
Conclusion
This paper aimed to understand the role of the Institute of International Finance in
global policymaking processes and governance through a study of its historical
development and involvement in the governance of sovereign debt crisis resolu-
tion. Three questions were addressed: (i) how has the IIF’s structure and mission
developed; (ii) how has the IIF’s role in global financial governance developed; and
(iii) how can we explain these developments?
The analysis demonstrated that the role of private interest groups like the IIF can
be explained by analyzing the two-directional interactions betweendevelopments in
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the market, interest groups, and public policymakers. The uniquely influential role
of the IIF is as much driven by its powerful membership base as by the “demand
side” of global level policymakers who prefer it as an interlocutor. Facedwith emerg-
ing, global public policymaking processes, the IIF restructured its organization,
expanded its membership, and took on private governance roles to remain the
key interlocutor. Moreover, a similarly recursive relation exists between market
structure and interest group. Through activities aimed at increasing transparency
in the market, the IIF contributes to the expansion of the market and shapes its
scope. Organizational self-interest and competition with rival associations explain
why the IIF developed private governance mechanisms with respect to sovereign
debt crisis resolution, which subsequently shaped this market by instilling a norm
of collective participation in debt restructurings. The IIF succeeded in remaining
the private sector focal point in global financial governance, even though earlier
changes in the market structure would have warranted a more prominent role for
other associations.
These conclusions have a number of important implications for the literature
on global governance and private interest representation. First, it points to the
need to reconceptualize interest group dynamics. The traditional unidirectional
analysis of lobbying, where developments in the market lead to policy positions
that interest groups represent to policymakers, does not suffice to fully understand
private interest representation. The recursive relations between interest groups,
public policymaking processes, and developments in the market structure
should be analyzed. The advocacy of interest groups might be as much driven
by developments in public policymaking processes as it is by changes in market
structures. More importantly, the evidence presented here suggests such recursive
interactions go beyond the interest group—public policymaking process relation.
Interest groups shape the market structure through private governance mecha-
nisms as much as they represent market interests. In other words, to fully under-
stand the role of interest groups we need to extend the analysis to private
governance mechanisms and their impact on the market.
Second, we need to analyze private governance in relation to public policy-
making processes and competition among interest groups. Recently, the literature
on private-sector influence on global public policymaking processes has increas-
ingly focused on coalition formation.100 However, the analysis presented here
points to the importance of analyzing interest group competition, how that leads
to patterns of private governance, and how these relate to the opportunities and
constraints emanating from global policymaking processes. This is an important
extension of recent literature on global governance.
100 Pagliari and Young (2020), Young and Pagliari (2017), and Chalmers (2020).
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These implications point to a number of avenues for future research. First
of all, more research into the IIF as an intermediary between the market and
public policymaking is warranted: Is the IIF an effective two-way translator
making proposals for both market agents and public policy makers simultane-
ously? In addition, the framework developed in this paper should be examined
and refined in policy areas beyond finance. Another important line of enquiry is
the analysis of the effectiveness of the private governance role in terms of
shaping markets, what the drivers of more or less effective governance roles
are, and how it feeds back into interest group structure and behavior. Finally,
the determinants of interassociation competition in relation to developments in
the market structure could be further theorized and empirically assessed.
Pursuing these lines of inquiry will make important contributions to our under-
standing of the relations between market structures, interest representation,
and public policymaking processes.
Bibliography
Banque de France. 2003. “Towards a Code of Good Conduct of Sovereign Debt Re-negotiation.”
G10. 1996 “The Resolution of Sovereign Liquidity Crisis.”
G20. 2003. “Communique of the fifth G-20 Minister of Finance and Central Bank Governors
meeting (Morelia Communique).”
G20. 2004. “Communique of the Berlin Minister of Finance and Central Bank Governors meeting.”
IIF. 1983. “By-Laws.”
IIF. 1995. “Improving standards for data release by Emerging Market Economies.”
IIF. 1996. “Resolving Sovereign Financial Crises.”
IIF. 2002. “Action plan of the IIF special committee on crisis prevention and resolution in emerging
markets.”
IIF. 2004. “Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets.”
IIF. 2005. “Investor Relations: An Approach to Effective Communication and Enhanced
Transparency.”
IIF. 2007. The First 25 Years, 1982–2007. Washington, DC: IIF.
IIF. 2012. Response to the Global Financial Crisis, 2007–2012. Washington, DC: IIF.
IMF Archives. 1983. “The Institute for International Finance, Inc.” SM/83/172.
IMF Archives. 1995. “Note on an International Debt Adjustment Facility for Sovereign Debtors.”
EBS/95/90.
IMF. 2001. “Address by Anne Krueger ‘International financial architecture for 2002: a new
approach to sovereign debt restructuring.’” 26 November.
IMF. 2005. “Progress Report to the International Monetary and Financial Committee on Crisis
Resolution.” 12 April.
IMF. 2013. “Sovereign Debt Restructuring – Recent developments and implications for the Fund’s
legal and policy framework.” 26 April.
PCG. 2007. “Report on Implementation.”
The Institute of International Finance 23
References
Baker, Andrew. 2006. The Group of Seven: Finance ministries, central banks and global financial
governance. New York: Routledge.
Baker, Andrew, and Duncan Wigan. 2017. “Constructing and contesting City of London power:
NGOs and the emergence of noisier financial politics.” Economy and Society 46 (2): 185–210.
Börzel, Tanja, and Thomas Risse. 2005. “Public-Private Partnerships. Effective and Legitimate
Tools of Transnational Governance?” In Complex Sovereignty: On the Reconstitution of
Political Authority in the 21st Century, edited by Edgar Grande and Louis W. Pauly. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press.
Brooks, Skylar. 2019. “The Politics of Regulatory Design in the Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Regime.” Global Governance 25: 393–417.
Büthe, Tim. 2010a. “Engineering uncontestedness? The origins and institutional development of
the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).” Business and Politics 12 (3): 1–62.
Büthe, Tim. 2010b. “Private regulation in the global economy: A (p)review.” Business and Politics
12 (3): 1–38.
Chalmers, Adam W. 2017. “When banks lobby: the effects of organization characteristics and
banking regulations on international bank lobbying.” Business and Politics 19 (1): 107–34.
Chalmers, Adam W. 2020. “Unity and conflict: Explaining financial industry lobbying success in
European Union public consultations” Regulation & Governance 14 (3): 389–408.
Claessens, Stijn, Geoffrey R.D. Underhill, and Xiaoke Zhang. 2008. “The Political Economy of Basle
II: the costs for poor countries.” The World Economy 31 (3): 313–44.
Cline, William R. 1995. International debt re-examined. Institute for International Economics.
Coleman, W.D. 1994. “Banking, interest intermediation and political power.” European Journal of
Political Research 26: 31–58.
Cutler, A. Claire, Haufler, Virginia and Tony Porter. 1999. Private authority and international affairs.
Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Gelpern, Anna, and Mitu Gulati. 2006. “Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study.”
Washington University Law Review 84 (7): 1627–716.
Hall, Rodney B., and Thomas J. Biersteker (eds.). 2002. The emergence of private authority in
global governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Haufler, Virginia. 2001. The Public Role of the Private Sector: Industry Self-Regulation in a Global
Economy. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Helleiner, Eric. 1994. States and the re-emergence of global finance. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press.
Helleiner, Eric. 2008. “The mystery of the missing sovereign debt restructuring mechanism.”
Contributions to Political Economy 27: 91–113.
Helleiner, Eric. 2009. “Filling a hole in global financial governance? The politics of regulating
sovereign debt restructuring.” In The politics of global regulation, edited by Walter Mattli and
Ngaire Woods. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kalaitzake, Manolis. 2017. “The political power of finance: The Institute of International Finance in
the Greek debt crisis.” Politics and Society 45 (3): 389–413.
Kapstein, Ethan B. 1994. Governing the global economy, international finance and the state.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Lall, Ranjit. 2012. “From failure to failure: The politics of international banking regulation” Review
of International Political Economy 19 (4): 609–38.
24 Jasper Blom
Macartney, Huw, David Howarth, and Scott James. 2020. “Bank power and public policy since the
financial crisis.” Business and Politics 22 (1): 1–24.
McKeen-Edwards, Heather. 2009. “Institute of International Finance, Inc.” In Handbook of
Transnational Economic Governance Regimes, edited by Christian Tietje and Alan Brouder.
Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
McKeen-Edwards, Heather, and Tony Porter. 2013. Transnational Financial Associations and the
Governance of Global Finance. New York: Routledge.
Moran, Michael. 1991. The politics of the financial services revolution. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Mosley, Layna. 2009. “Private Governance for the Public Good? Exploring Private Sector
Participation in Global Financial Regulation.” In Power, Interdependence, and Non-State
Actors in World Politics, edited by Helen V. Milner and Andrew Moravcsik. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Mügge, Daniel K. 2008. “Keeping competitors out: Industry structure and transnational private
governance in global finance.” In Transnational private governance and its limits, edited by
Jean-Christophe Graz and Andreas Nölke. New York: Routledge.
Newman, Abraham, and Elliot Posner. 2016. “Structuring transnational interests: the second-order
effects of soft law in the politics of global finance.” Review of International Political Economy
23 (5): 768–98.
Newman, Abraham, and Elliot Posner. 2018. Voluntary Disruptions: international soft law, finance,
and power. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Oatley, T., and R. Nabors. 1998. “Redistributive cooperation: market failure, wealth transfers, and
the Basle Accord.” International Organization 52: 35–54.
Pagliari, Stefano, and Kevin Young. 2014. “Leveraged interests: Financial industry power and the
role of private sector coalitions.” Review of International Political Economy 21 (3): 575–610.
Posner, Elliot. 2009. The origins of Europe’s new stock markets. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Rieffel, Lex. 2003. Restructuring sovereign debt, the case for ad-hoc machinery. Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press.
Ritter, Raymond. 2010. “Transnational governance in global finance: The Principles for Stable
Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets.” International Studies
Perspectives 11: 222–41.
Rogoff, Kenneth, and Jerome Zettelmeyer. 2002. “Bankruptcy procedures for sovereigns: a history
of ideas, 1976–2001.” IMF Working Paper, WP/02/133.
Sachs, Jeffrey. 1986. “Managing the LDC debt crisis,” Brookings papers on economic activity, issue 2.
Shaffer, Gregory C. 2003. Defending interests: Public-private partnerships in WTO litigation.
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Singer, David A. 2007. Regulating capital: Setting standards for the international financial system.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Soederberg, Susanne. 2005. “The transnational debt architecture and emerging markets: the
politics of paradoxes and punishment.” Third World Quarterly 26: 927–49.
Surrey, W.S., and P.N. Nash. 1984. “Bankers look beyond the debt crisis: The Institute of
International Finance, Inc.” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 23: 111–30.
Tarullo, Daniel K. 2008. Banking on Basel, the future of international financial regulation.
Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.
Tsingou, Eleni. 2008. “Transnational private governance and the Basel process.” In Transnational
private governance and its limits, edited by Jean-Christophe Graz and Andreas Nölke.
New York: Routledge.
The Institute of International Finance 25
Tsingou, Eleni. 2015. “Club governance and the making of global financial rules.” Review of
International Political Economy 22 (2): 225–56.
Underhill, Geoffrey R.D. 1995. “Keeping Governments out of Politics: Transnational Securities
Markets, Regulatory Co-operation, and Political Legitimacy.” Review of International Studies
21 (3): 251–78.
Underhill, Geoffrey R.D. (ed.). 1997. The new world order in international finance. New York:
St. Martin’s Press.
Underhill, Geoffrey R.D. 2015. “The Emerging Post-Crisis Financial Architecture: the path-
dependency of ideational adverse selection.” British Journal of Politics and International
Relations 17 (3): 461–93.
Woll, Cornelia. 2007. “Leading the dance? Power and political resources of business lobbyist.”
Journal of Public Policy 27 (1): 57–78.
Woll, Cornelia. 2008. Firm interests: How governments shape business lobbying on global trade.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Wood, Duncan. 2005. Governing global banking: the Basel committee and the politics of financial
globalization. Farnham, United Kingdom: Ashgate.
Young, Kevin. 2012. “Transnational regulatory capture? An empirical examination of the trans-
national lobbying of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.” Review of International
Political Economy 19 (4): 663–88.
Young, Kevin. 2013. “Financial industry groups’ adaptation to the post-crisis regulatory environ-
ment: Changing approaches to the policy cycle.” Regulation & Governance 7: 460–80.
Young, Kevin, and Stefano Pagliari. 2017. “Capital united? Business unity in regulatory politics
and the special place of finance.” Regulation & Governance 11: 3–23.
26 Jasper Blom
